Will your
email land?
Stamp reads the DNS records Gmail and Outlook check, and tells you what to fix.
Sample checks from the dates shown. Open one for a live reading.
- SPF
Who may send as you: 6 of 10 lookups
Past ten lookups it fails silently
0
- DKIM
Your signature: 1024-bit key
Accepted, but 2048-bit is recommended
−2
- DMARC
What receivers do with fakes: no record
Gmail and Yahoo require it from bulk senders
−26
- MX
Where replies go: two hosts answer
A domain that cannot receive mail looks disposable
0
- MTA-STS
Forced encryption to you: not published
Without it, TLS can be stripped
−2
- Blocklists
Your domain and mail servers on public blocklists: clear
One listing can bounce a whole campaign
0
A good grade can still be forged
Your records decide what a forged email in your name meets. Stamp works it out without sending one. Shown for a made-up domain.
Yes. An attacker can buy a domain your SPF trusts, and send as acme.example.
Forge your address
Send from any server with From: ceo@acme.example.
DMARC fails and the policy says refuse, so forged mail is turned away at the door.
RefusedMake up a subdomain
Send as billing@secure.acme.example, a name you never created.
DMARC fails, and the policy is report-only, so nothing tells the receiver to act on mail from a made-up subdomain.
Not stoppedBorrow a service you use
Open an account at a service your SPF approves, and try to send as you.
Your SPF approves servers shared with every other customer of SendGrid. Mail from them passes SPF, so it rests on those services verifying who owns your domain.
DependsBuy a domain you trust
Register an expired domain your records still point at.
old-mailer.example is unregistered and in your SPF. Whoever registers it can pass as acme.example.
Not stopped
Worked out on paper from what acme.example publishes; nothing is sent. It shows what your records ask, not what any inbox will do.
The forged letter
Simulated. Nothing was sent. What a receiver would write on mail forged as acme.example, worked out from its records.
- From
- ceo@
acme. example - Sent from, a server the forger controls
- mail.
attacker. example [192.0.2.25] - Subject
- Please pay this invoice today
What the receiver would add
Authentication-Results: mx.receiver.example;
spf=
softfail (sender IP is 192. 0. 2. 25, not approved) smtp. mailfrom= ceo@ acme. example SPF says probably not allowed, but only advises.
dkim=
none (message not signed) The forger has no key, so there is no signature.
dmarc=
fail (p= REJECT dis= REJECT) header. from= acme. example DMARC fails, and the policy says refuse.
- A refused message never reaches an inbox; these results stay in the receiver's logs.
16 of 195well-known organisations do not ask receivers to act on mail forged in their name.
What each organisation's records asked receivers to do with a fake on 4 November 2026. This is not a judgement of its overall security.
See the scoreboard- Refused
- Spam folder
- Depends
- Not stopped
- Banks96%96% refused, of 26 checked.
- Software88%13%88% refused, of 24 checked.
- Health76%12%76% refused, of 25 checked.
- Retail76%12%12%76% refused, of 25 checked.
- Airlines71%13%13%71% refused, of 24 checked.
- Media70%17%70% refused, of 23 checked.
- Telecoms58%17%13%13%58% refused, of 24 checked. 1 could not be read.
- Universities38%25%13%25%38% refused, of 24 checked.
Show these numbers as a table
| Sector | Refused | Spam folder | Depends | Not stopped | Could not be read |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banks | 25 (96%) | 1 (4%) | 0 (0%) | 0 (0%) | 0 |
| Software | 21 (88%) | 3 (13%) | 0 (0%) | 0 (0%) | 0 |
| Health | 19 (76%) | 3 (12%) | 1 (4%) | 2 (8%) | 0 |
| Retail | 19 (76%) | 3 (12%) | 3 (12%) | 0 (0%) | 0 |
| Airlines | 17 (71%) | 3 (13%) | 1 (4%) | 3 (13%) | 0 |
| Media | 16 (70%) | 4 (17%) | 1 (4%) | 2 (9%) | 0 |
| Telecoms | 14 (58%) | 4 (17%) | 3 (13%) | 3 (13%) | 1 |
| Universities | 9 (38%) | 6 (25%) | 3 (13%) | 6 (25%) | 0 |
Percentages are rounded separately, so a row may not add up to 100.
Everything else Stamp can do
Each opens with a real example.
Find risks
- DNS lookup
Every record for a domain, blocklists for an IP
- Trust map
Every domain your email depends on
- Find lookalikes
Names registered to look like yours
Fix records
- Write records
Tick who sends as you, get the records
- Route to Refused
Safe, tested steps to refuse forged mail
- Try a change
Preview an edit before you publish
- Check DNS changes
See who has your new record yet
Read your mail
- Trace an email
Paste headers to see a message's route
- Read DMARC reports
Provider XML reports, made readable
Many domains
- Check a fleet
Up to 25 domains in one table, worst first
- Compare
Up to 4 domains side by side
- Badges and API
README badge, JSON and a CI check