Reading DNS records, live.
- MX records and mail servers
- SPF, following every include
- DKIM on 36 common selectors
- DMARC policy
- MTA-STS and TLS reporting
- Five public blocklists
Reading DNS records, live.
Mail handled by Mimecast. Checked 10 Nov, 00:14 UTC in 3.1 s.
Authenticated and protected: SPF, DKIM and DMARC are in place and DMARC is enforced.
3 changes, most damaging first, each with its record.
One or two more includes will push this record over the limit. Check before adding another sending service.
"selector1" (1024-bit), "k1" (1024-bit), "s2" (1024-bit), "mail" (1024-bit), "smtp" (1024-bit), "mandrill" (1024-bit), "cm" (1024-bit): still accepted, but 2048-bit is the current recommendation. Rotate at the next key change.
Without MTA-STS, an attacker on the network can strip TLS from mail sent to you. It needs one TXT record and a small policy file on https://mta-sts.unimelb.edu.au.
Then serve the policy at https://mta-sts.unimelb.edu.au/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
TLS-RPT sends you a daily report of senders that failed to connect securely. Useful before turning on MTA-STS enforcement.
DMARC is enforced, so this domain qualifies to show its logo next to messages in Gmail, Yahoo and Apple Mail. It needs an SVG Tiny PS logo and, for Gmail and Apple Mail, a logo certificate: a Verified Mark Certificate, or for Gmail a Common Mark Certificate.
What an attacker could do with this setup.
Not by the usual routes. Your records tell receivers to refuse forged mail.
Send from any server with From: ceo@unimelb.edu.au.
DMARC fails and the policy says refuse, so forged mail is turned away at the door.
Send as billing@secure.unimelb.edu.au, a name you never created.
DMARC fails and the policy says refuse, so mail from a made-up subdomain is turned away at the door.
Open an account at a service your SPF approves, and try to send as you.
Your SPF approves servers shared with every other customer of Campaign Monitor, Mandrill, Microsoft 365. Mail from them passes SPF, so it rests on those services verifying who owns your domain.
Register an expired domain your records still point at.
All 3 outside domains your records trust are still registered and resolving.
Worked out on paper from what unimelb.edu.au publishes; nothing is sent. It shows what your records ask, not what any inbox will do.
Simulated. Nothing was sent. What a receiver would write on mail forged as unimelb.edu.au, worked out from its records.
What the receiver would add
Authentication-Results: mx.receiver.example;
spf=
SPF is broken, so it cannot approve or refuse anyone.
dkim=
The forger has no key, so there is no signature.
dmarc=
DMARC fails, and the policy says refuse.
Every outside domain in your SPF, MX and DMARC records, checked against DNS and its registry. Attackers buy the expired ones.
3 outside domains checked: all still registered and resolving. A domain that changed hands and still resolves cannot be spotted.
At least 955,474 IPv4 addresses are listed as allowed to pass SPF as unimelb.edu.au, and 1 hostname only known when mail arrives.
| Sender | Type | IPv4 addresses |
|---|---|---|
| mim.ec9uvu6ijb. | Not recognised | 955,474 |
| Campaign MonitorDKIM selector cm | Marketing | Seen signing, not in SPF |
| MandrillDKIM selector mandrill | Transactional | Seen signing, not in SPF |
| Microsoft 365DKIM selector selector1 | Mailbox | Seen signing, not in SPF |
Log scale. Unrecognised is not bad, but if nobody knows it, remove it. DKIM-only services appear only if their selector is known.
No record stops a domain that only looks like yours. Find lookalikes of unimelb.edu.au
Each provider's bulk-sender rules, read against this domain's DNS.
The parts DNS can show meet these rules. 19 more cannot be seen from DNS, so this is not the whole answer.
For senders of more than 5,000 messages a day to Gmail accounts. 4 of 4 rows DNS can show are seen. Rules read on 4 Nov 2026
| Requirement | What Stamp found |
|---|---|
SPF set upSet up SPF and DKIM email authentication for your domain.SourceA valid record is published. Whether a message passes depends on the server that sent it. | Seen in DNS |
DKIM set upSet up SPF and DKIM email authentication for your domain.SourceStamp read a usable key at "selector1", "k1", "k2", "k3", "s1", "s2", "mail", "smtp", "mandrill", "cm". Whether messages are signed with it only shows in a real email. | Seen in DNS |
DKIM key of 1024 bits or longerSending to personal Gmail accounts requires a DKIM key of 1024 bits or longer.SourceLongest key read: 2048 bits. | Seen in DNS |
DMARC set up, at least p=noneSet up DMARC email authentication for your sending domain. Your DMARC enforcement policy can be set to none.SourcePublished with p=reject. Whether a message passes DMARC only shows in a real email. | Seen in DNS |
| Requirement | What Stamp found |
|---|---|
From: domain alignedFor direct email, the domain in the sender's From: header must be aligned with either the SPF domain or the DKIM domain.SourcePaste the headers of a delivered message into Trace an email. It shows whether SPF or DKIM lined up with the From: domain. Open Trace an email | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Forward and reverse DNS for the senderEnsure that sending domains or IPs have valid forward and reverse DNS records, also referred to as PTR records.SourceLook up the PTR record of the IP that sends your mail, then look up the name it returns. That name should lead back to the same IP. |
For bulk senders, meaning a significant volume of mail. Yahoo does not publish a number. 4 of 4 rows DNS can show are seen. Rules read on 4 Nov 2026
| Requirement | What Stamp found |
|---|---|
SPF implementedImplement both SPF & DKIMSourceA valid record is published. Whether a message passes depends on the server that sent it. | Seen in DNS |
DKIM implementedImplement both SPF & DKIMSourceStamp read a usable key at "selector1", "k1", "k2", "k3", "s1", "s2", "mail", "smtp", "mandrill", "cm". Whether messages are signed with it only shows in a real email. | Seen in DNS |
For senders of 5,000 or more messages to Microsoft consumer email services from one From: domain. 4 of 4 rows DNS can show are seen. Rules read on 4 Nov 2026
| Requirement | What Stamp found |
|---|---|
SPF record publishedPublish SPF and DKIM records for the domainSourceA valid record is published. Whether a message passes depends on the server that sent it. | Seen in DNS |
DKIM record publishedPublish SPF and DKIM records for the domainSourceStamp read a usable key at "selector1", "k1", "k2", "k3", "s1", "s2", "mail", "smtp", "mandrill", "cm". Whether messages are signed with it only shows in a real email. | Seen in DNS |
Read from DNS; nothing is sent. Stamp cannot see your volume or sending IPs, so it cannot say which apply. Does not affect the grade.
Which servers may send as unimelb.edu.au, read left to right.
Where the lookups go
Keys that prove a message is yours and unchanged.
| Selector | Key | Strength | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| Selectorselector1 | Keyrsa | Strength1024-bit | StateRotate soon |
| Selectork1 | Keyrsa | Strength1024-bit | StateRotate soon |
| Selectork2 | Keyrsa | Strength2048-bit | StateSigning |
| Selectork3 | Keyrsa | Strength2048-bit | StateSigning |
| Selectors1 | Keyrsa | Strength2048-bit | StateSigning |
| Selectors2 | Keyrsa | Strength1024-bit | StateRotate soon |
| Selectormail | Keyrsa | Strength1024-bit | StateRotate soon |
| Selectorsmtp | Keyrsa | Strength1024-bit | StateRotate soon |
| Selectormandrill | Keyrsa | Strength1024-bit | StateRotate soon |
| Selectorcm | Keyrsa | Strength1024-bit | StateRotate soon |
What receivers do with mail failing SPF and DKIM, and where reports go.
v=
Mail for unimelb.edu.au is handled by Mimecast.
| Priority | Host | Addresses |
|---|---|---|
| Priority10 | Hostau- | Addresses103.96.20.26103.96.22.26 |
| Priority10 | Hostau- | Addresses103.96.20.26103.96.22.26 |
Whether senders must use TLS to reach you, and whether you hear when they cannot.
Your inbound mail servers (not always the senders) and the domain, against 5 public blocklists.
| Checked | Spamhaus ZEN | SpamCop | Barracuda | PSBL | Spamhaus DBL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Checked103.96.20.26 | Spamhaus ZENClear | SpamCopClear | BarracudaClear | PSBLClear | Spamhaus DBLNot applicable |
| Checked103.96.22.26 | Spamhaus ZENClear | SpamCopClear | BarracudaClear | PSBLClear | Spamhaus DBLNot applicable |
| Checkedunimelb.edu.au | Spamhaus ZENNot applicable | SpamCopNot applicable | BarracudaNot applicable | PSBLNot applicable | Spamhaus DBLClear |
Your logo in Gmail, Yahoo and Apple Mail. Optional; needs enforced DMARC.
Not published.
| Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
TLS when sendingUse a TLS connection for transmitting email.SourcePaste the headers of a delivered message into Trace an email. It shows TLS for each leg of the route. Open Trace an email | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
|---|
Spam rate below 0.30%Keep spam rates reported in Postmaster Tools below 0.30%.SourceRead your domain's spam rate in Google Postmaster Tools. The same page advises staying below 0.10%. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
|---|
Messages follow RFC 5322Format messages according to the Internet Message Format standard, RFC 5322.SourceSend a test message by your usual route and read its raw headers. RFC 5322 requires one From: and one Date: header. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
|---|
No Gmail From: addressesDon’t impersonate Gmail From: headers.SourceCheck each tool that sends for you. None should put a gmail.com address in From:. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
|---|
One-click unsubscribe and a visible linkMarketing messages and subscribed messages must support one-click unsubscribe, and include a clearly visible unsubscribe link in the message body.SourceSend yourself a marketing message. Look for the List-Unsubscribe and List-Unsubscribe-Post headers, and a link in the body. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
|---|
We require a DKIM key length of 1024 bits or greaterSource
| Seen in DNS |
DMARC published, at least p=nonePublish a valid DMARC policy with at least p=noneSourcePublished with p=reject. Whether a message passes DMARC only shows in a real email. | Seen in DNS |
|---|
| Requirement | What Stamp found |
|---|---|
From: domain aligned, and DMARC passesEnsure the domain in the From: header is aligned with either the SPF domain or the DKIM domain.SourcePaste the headers of a delivered message into Trace an email. It shows whether SPF or DKIM lined up with the From: domain. Open Trace an email | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Forward and reverse DNS for the senderHave a valid forward and reverse DNS record for your sending IPsSourceLook up the PTR record of the IP that sends your mail, then look up the name it returns. That name should lead back to the same IP. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Spam rate below 0.3%Keep your spam rate below 0.3%SourceYahoo works this out from mail delivered to the inbox, so allow for that when you read its Complaint Feedback Loop data. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Mail follows RFC 5321 and RFC 5322Comply with RFCs 5321 and 5322SourceAsk your sending service about RFC 5321, which covers how its servers talk to receivers. For RFC 5322, read the raw headers of a test message: one From: and one Date: are required. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
One-click List-Unsubscribe headerImplement a functioning list-unsubscribe header, which supports one-click unsubscribe for marketing and subscribed messagesSourceRead the raw headers of a marketing message. Yahoo highly recommends the RFC 8058 POST method and accepts mailto. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Visible unsubscribe linkHave a clearly visible unsubscribe link in the email bodySourceOpen a marketing message and find the link. It may lead to a preference page. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Unsubscribes honored within 2 daysHonor unsubscribes within 2 daysSourceUnsubscribe a test address, then watch whether it gets mail after 2 days. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
DMARC published, at least p=noneAt least p=none and align with either SPF or DKIM (preferably both).SourcePublished with p=reject. Whether a message passes DMARC only shows in a real email. | Seen in DNS |
|---|
From: or Reply-To can receive repliesRecommended, not requiredEnsure the “From” or “Reply‐To” address is valid, reflects the true sending domain, and can receive replies.Sourceunimelb.edu.au has mail servers that resolve. Stamp sends nothing, so this address has not been tested. | Seen in DNS |
|---|
| Requirement | What Stamp found |
|---|---|
Messages pass SPF and DKIMBoth SPF and DKIM checks must pass.SourcePaste the headers of a delivered message into Trace an email to read both results. Open Trace an email | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Messages pass DMARC, with SPF or DKIM alignedMessages from senders in the domain must pass DMARC validationSourcePaste the headers of a delivered message into Trace an email. It shows whether SPF or DKIM lined up with the From: domain. Open Trace an email | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Clear way to opt outRecommended, not requiredProvide an easy, clearly visible way for recipients to opt out of further messages, particularly for marketing or bulk mail.SourceOpen a marketing message and follow its unsubscribe link. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Invalid addresses removedRecommended, not requiredRemove invalid addresses regularly to reduce spam complaints, bounces, and wasted messages.SourceRead the bounce report in your sending service. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |
Accurate subjects and real consentRecommended, not requiredUse accurate subject lines, avoid deceptive headers, and ensure your recipients have consented to receive your messages.SourceReview your sign-up forms and recent subject lines. | Stamp cannot see this from DNS |